The Space Race of the fifties and sixties was hardly a race; The Soviet Union dominated the playing field by quickly racking up dozens of “firsts”, such as the first satellite in orbit and the first spacewalk. The latter, completed by Alexei Leonov in 1965, demonstrates the superiority of the early Soviet program, ran by Sergei Pavlovich Korloev, the Chief Designer of OKB-1. Leonov states that Korolev’s “power, influence, and responsibilities. were almost impossible to comprehend” (Leonov and Scott, 79).
However, even with his technical brilliance, the success of the early Soviet missions lies ot only in the intelligence of the engineers, but also the personalities of the leaders. Korolev’s trust of the cosmonauts and competitive nature allows the Soviet Space Program to gain an early start, while his successor’s timid nature derails the progress which he worked so hard to achieve. With much interest in the opinions of the cosmonauts, Korolev understood the importance of the insight of users of his spacecraft. In Two Sides of the Moon, Leonov recalls how Korolev tasked him with testing the exit on the Vokshod It capsule.
Afterwards, Leonov discusses the design flaws, as well as potential solutions with he engineers and Korolev himself (Leonov and Scott, 78-79). By introducing another user into the situation- the cosmonaut who would rely on the usability of the exit in particular- Korolev gains an unbiased insight into the true quality of the engineering of the capsule. While the engineers may have the skills and the competency to construct the exit, the lack of perspective often leads to unintended consequences, such as inhibited usability.
Korolev succeeds in mitigating these issues, through which he demonstrates a strong understanding of the effect of user experience. Usability. gov indicates that “user experience practices promote improving the quality of the user’s interaction with and perceptions of your product and any related services” (User Experience Basics). In devoting attention to the cosmonaut’s opinions, Korolev effectively builds a working relationship with the cosmonauts, such as Leonov. This working relationship becomes a vital playing card for Korolev as the time for the first spacewalk draws near.
After the failure of the unmanned Vokshod II launch (which resulted in a complete data loss), Korolev successfully rallies the ompetitiveness of Leonov and Belyayev to take the risk to head into space, and beat the Americans to the first spacewalk. Leonov remembers, “then, very cannily, he added that he believed the Americans were preparing. to make a spacewalk in May”, to which Leonov responds, “Despite the risks, we were ready to fly” (Leonov and Scott, 100). Leonov made his spacewalk on 18 March 1965, whereas Ed White went on to make his spacewalk on 3 June 1965 (Green, 5).
Had Korolev not understood Leonov’s and Belyayev’s competitiveness and commitment to outpacing the Americans, the Soviet Union ould have lost the title for first Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA). He was able to entice the cosmonauts into agreeing to continue, rather than forcing them to cancel or continue the mission. Through this interaction with Leonov, it becomes clear that Korolev’s leadership ability extended far beyond the “power” or “influence” which he was known for, where he could “silence a person with the smallest gesture of a hand” (Leonov and Scott, 79).
He does not view himself as superior or all-knowing. He resorts to simple honesty. He chooses to consult the cosmonauts prior to making a decision. Most importantly, egardless of whether the decision influences the mission itself or the design aspect of equipment to be used by the cosmonauts, Korolev is decisive, unlike his successor, Vasily Mishin. The lack of decisiveness of his successor, Vasily Mishin, leads to the stall of the Soviet Space Program.
Overly cautious, Mishin recounts that during the launch of Yuri Gagarin into orbit, “I, at the time, would not venture for the launch… ecause the risk of success-of unsuccess [sic] in this launch-still remained” (Interview with Vassily P. Mishin). In response to why the manned lunar missions were called off, he states, “One must ot launch a human into space if there is no certainty about his safe return back to Earth” (Interview with Vassily P. Mishin). This directly contrasts Korolev’s willingness to take risks, and conflicts with the nature of space exploration itself. Space is the “final frontier”; much like the depths of the ocean, there is only a miniscule amount of information which exists about space.
Understandably, Mishin does have interest in the safety of the cosmonauts. To him, placing a human being in a potentially deadly situation-especially after the death of Vladimir Komarov uring Soyuz 1-is no easy task. For Mishin, much of the fear and uncertainty is eased when data exists to indicate success. However, in a race against the U. S. to land on the moon and secure his nation’s claim of technological superiority, the time which Mishin wastes and the timid nature of his actions result in the loss of confidence from both senior government officials, and the cosmonauts themselves.
Mishin’s inability to maintain a positive relationship with the cosmonauts only further widens the gap between where Mishin stood as a leader, and where the space program needed him as a leader. In an effort to revitalize the space program, Mishin creates a rift between the cosmonauts from the military, and those in the new selection-all of whom are civilians. Leonov states, “A second group of civilians.. included engineers from OKB-1..
Mishin, who knew many of the engineers well, favored them and did everything he could do to promote them, which created great tension” (Leonov and Scott, 146). With a position of responsibility such as Mishin’s, playing “favorites” seems unusual, especially given the fact that many of the engineers came from Mishin’s design bureau. By not maintaining a rofessional, fair working environment, Mishin’s actions go beyond poor thought and planning. His actions are irresponsible, and to believe that none of the military cosmonauts would have taken issue with the decision is delusional.
With the military cosmonauts holding the majority of the experience and the majority of the skill at the time, the risk of alienating the veterans for the sake of a few friendships risked more than upset space-goers. Had the cosmonauts raised protest and revoked their service with the cosmonaut corps as a result of tension between them and their leader, the lready flailing space program may have completely crumbled. With one leader fearlessly aiming for the stars, and the other guided by fear, the success of the Soviet Space Program did not solely rely on technical genius, but rather in the leadership and confidence of the leaders themselves.
While Korolev accepted the risk of exploring the unknown and pushed through the possibility of tragedy, Mishin refused to move forward because the unknown was just that. Whereas Korolev strived to maintain a strong working relationship with the cosmonauts, whose lives were entrusted in his abilities to deliver safe spacecraft, Mishin nstead catered to the desires of those who surrounded him, much to the chagrin of the cosmonauts whose lives he was responsible for.
David Scott mentions in the epilogue, “it was the brilliance and drive… and his determination to succeed against all odds that drove them to excel” (Leonov and Scott, 389). Only through this state of mind, to overcome, to improve, to risk, and to learn did the cosmonauts have a chance to travel beyond Earth. As a result, the early Soviet Space Program dominated the cosmos and bravely paved the way for the first steps into the vast frontiers of space.
