In this essay, I will examine whether T. M. Scanlon dodges Prichard’s dilemma. To analyse, first, I will show the structure of Prichard’s dilemma. Second, I will present how Scanlon solve the dilemma that is defined by Scanlon as Prichard’s dilemma. With hlon’s definition of the dilemma, Scanlon’s account seems to solve the dilemma. Third, I will compare the structure of the dilemma that Prichard discusses with that of Prichard’s dilemma as understood by Scanlon. By comparing the two dilemmas, I will argue that Scanlon misunderstands the structure of the dilemma that Prichard discusses.
Finally, I will conclude that Scanlon’s account falls into the dilemma that Prichard discusses, and will argue that Scanlon fails to dodge Prichard’s dilemma. In his essay ‘Does Moral Philosophy Rest on A Mistake? ‘ H. A. Prichard examines the reason to be moral. Prichard concludes that there is no reason that appropriately answers the question ‘why be moral? ‘. To support his argument, Prichard refers to two arguments that we face when we think about the reason to be moral. The first argument is dilemma that is, today, called ‘Prichard’s dilemma’.
The second argument appeals to the analogy of the ‘Theory of Knowledge’. Although the second argument is important in explaining why Prichard considers that there is no reason to be moral, in this essay, for our purpose, I will only deal with Prichard’s first argument, i. e. , ‘Prichard’s dilemma’. According to Prichard, moral philosophy has provided two separate answers that are based on nonmoral and moral reasons to answer the question ‘why be moral? ‘. Prichard writes: So far as I can see, the answers [for the reason to be moral] all fall from necessities of the case, into one of two species.
Either they state that we ought to do so and so, because, as we see when we fully apprehend the facts, doing so will be for our good, i. e. really, as I would rather say, for our advantage, or better still, for our happiness; or they state that we ought to do so and so, because something realised either in or by the action is good. (1912: 22). Thus, the reason to be moral is either (a) because of the agent’s happiness or (b) because of the goodness of something involved in the action. The answer (a) is the nonmoral answer, and the answer (b) is the moral answer.
Prichard says that both reasons fails to support the reason to be moral, and this is the dilemma that Prichard elucidates. At first, according to Prichard, the argument that appeals to nonmoral reasons such as self-interest ends up by failing to provide appropriate answer. Historically, some philosophers have tried to explain the reason to be moral by showing that acting in a moral way leads to agents’ happiness (1912: 22). For Prichard, agents can feel happiness by satisfying their wants (1912: 23). However, even if it is true that acting in moral ways brings us happiness, this does not mean that we ought to act in moral ways.
Prichard argues that the moral behaviour that brings us happiness ‘only makes us want to keep’ (1912: 23) our engagements. In other words, the fact that acting in moral ways bringing agents’ happiness encourages agents’ inclination to be moral, but it is not the reason that agents ought to exhibit moral behaviours. Therefore, the argument that appeal to nonmoral reason fails to answer the question ‘why be moral? ‘ The second reason to be moral is (b) because of the goodness of something involved in the action.
This answer explains the obligation to be moral as being based on the intrinsic goodness either of the consequences of the action or of the action itself (1912: 23). Unlike (a), that appeals to individual interests and desire, this second reason seems to explain successfully obligation by appealing to an impersonal and objective view. Prichard explains that by admitting either that’any one’s happiness is good in itself or that ‘the working for happiness is itself good’, it is possible to avoid that obligation is merely regarded as inclination (1912: 23).
The second reason, which appeals to the intrinsic goodness of something involved in an action, additionally splits into two. The explanation of the reason to be moral is either that (b-1) if something produced by the action is good, then we ought to practice the action, which relies on Utilitarianism in broad sense or that (b-2) the act in itself is good. The explanation (b-1) is not a successful explanation of the reason to be moral, because this explanation includes two presuppositions that adds additional problems. One presupposition is what is good ought to be.
This assumption is false, according to Prichard, since ‘ought’ only refers to actions (1912: 24). The other presupposition that something produced by the action is good includes the feeling of imperativeness. However, Prichard (1912: 24) argues that we feel imperativeness for only action which is in our power. The explanation (b-2), which appeals to the goodness of the act in itself, seems also untenable, since this explanation falls into another dilemma (1912: 26). Good actions are described as good by approval or with respect to the motive, and the motive is derived either from a sense of obligation or from benevolence (1912: 26).
If a good action is done from a sense of obligation, the rightness of such an action is derived from the goodness of this action, but a good action is derived from the rightness of the action. This is circular. On the other hand, if the motive of the good action is derived from benevolence, this explanation fails, because the motive encourage agents want to be moral as I showed in (a). In sum, Prichard uses the term dilemma, because both nonmoral and moral reasons, which are (a) and (b), fail to answer the question ‘Why be moral? Scanlon defines ‘Prichard’s dilemma’ as follows: Attempts to explain how the fact that an action is wrong provides a reason not to do it face a difficult dilemma.
Understood in one way, the answer is obvious: the reason not to do the action is just that it is wrong. But this is surely not the kind of answer that is wanted … Suppose, on the other hand, that we were to appeal to some clearly nonmoral reason, such as that people have reason to be morally good because, taking into account the effort that deception requires, the likelihood of being found out, and the costs of social ostracism, it is in their self-interest to be moral.
This account might supply a reason for doing the right thing, but it would not be the kind of reason that we suppose a moral person first and foremost to be moved by. I will refer to this as Prichard’s dilemma (1998: 149-150). According to Scanlon (1998: 4, 153), an act is wrong if and only if its performance is disallowed by any sets of principles that no one could reasonably reject. This Scanlon’s criterion of wrongness suggests that moral acts are based on principles that others could not reasonably reject. Scanlon believes that he solves Prichard’s dilemma by successfully providing the reason not to act wrong.
The reason is the value of ‘mutual recognition’ (Scanlon 1998: 162). ‘Mutual recognition’ is a particular relationship in which people are capable of the relationship that no one could reasonably reject. Whilst Scanlon admits that standing in mutual recognition with others is much less personal than relationships such as friendship (1998: 162), the description of this way of living with others as a relationship seems to him to be phenomenologically accurate. When a person commits an unjustifiable action, he feels that he loses something valuable.
This feeling that derives from impermissible action, as well as the positive ‘pull one feels from moral action, stems from the ‘positive value of living with others on terms that they could not reasonably reject’ (1998: 162). With Scanlon’s definition of Prichard’s dilemma, Scanlon’s argument of mutual recognition seems successfully to dodge Prichard’s dilemma. If the reason to be moral is mutual recognition, the reason is not a self-interested reason; it is not a kind of reason from which moral persons are not motivated.
Moreover, mutual recognition is not a kind of moral reason that does not explain the reason to be moral, because it is a particular relationship that no one could reasonably reject. However, I believe that Scanlon’s account does not dodge Prichard’s dilemma. Scanlon’s definition of Prichard’s dilemma is in some ways similar to, but in other ways different from, the dilemma that Prichard actually discusses. The similar point is that both Prichard and Scanlon believe that nonmoral and moral reasons fail to explain the reason to be moral.
However, there are two different points. Firstly, although Scanlon argues that nonmoral reason that appeals to agents’ self-interest fails to explain the reason to be moral because it would not be the kind of reason that motivates a moral person, Prichard (1912:23) argues that the explanation fails because such reason only makes us want to be m Prichard does not think that nonmoral reason necessarily relates to the reason that does not motive a moral person.
Secondly, Prichard criticises the moral reason not to take action not because, unlike Scanlon, action is wrong, but because both accounts that rely on Utilitarianism and the intrinsic goodness involved in action fail to answer the question ‘why be moral? ‘ | think that Scanlon misunderstands the structure of the dilemma that Prichard discusses. Indeed, when defining Prichard’s dilemma, Scanlon (1998: 389n. 1) refers to a different dilemma that occurs by relying on moral reason to explain the reason to be moral. By a value of mutual recognition, some persons may act right, but the value only encourages persons want to be moral.
This is one horn of dilemma stemming from a nonmoral reason in Prichard’s dilemma. I assume that Prichard can agree with Scanlon’s argument that we have motivation to live with others in a manner that no one can reasonably reject. However, the problem that Prichard suggests is that even if we feel a sense of loss by violating a value of mutual recognition, that sense does not impose us obligation to be moral. Therefore, I conclude that Scanlon has not solved Prichard’s dilemma yet. The main reason why Scanlon fails to solve Prichard’ dilemma stems from Scanlon’s misunderstanding of the structure of Prichard’s dilemma.
