By the end of the 19th century expansion had become a predominant feature of American foreign policy. The continental westward expansion by the end of the 1880s; perceivably had reached its zenith, and abundant reasons existed for the acquisition of a new offshore commercial frontier. A depression; which forged a need to compete with foreign powers on a commercial and strategic level, as well as a sense of duty known as manifest destiny embodied the ideal and real interpretation of expansionist foreign policy.
Within foreign policy circles and the wider community; both staunch opposition and renewed support existed for the inflating empire, which transgressed traditional party lines and North-South divisions. The role of economic factors has played a dominant role in analyses conducted of this period. Justification was simple; it was Americas duty to continue its expansion and civilize the third world. The Splendid Little War of 1898, and the Open Door Notes of 1899-1900 represent a significant turning point in the global rise of the United States.
This paper shall focus on the difference of opinion that surrounded the war with Spain and the independent internationalism that resulted. The reasons for going to war were both real and ideal. Real, in the sense that; the war applied the Monroe Doctrine to the zone, and acted to secure the markets of Porto Rico, Cuba, and belatedly the Philippines to the expanding US export market. It was ideal in the sense that McKinley acted upon the sympathy, which the American people had felt for the neighbour oppressed by the imperial European power.
It must be noted that Americas concern was to uphold, at least ideally, a sense that they encouraged freedom of self government against imperialism. The case is that the opinions of the people of the acquired territories were not at all considered, only the American national interest, thus providing the paradox between the reasons and justifications of US expansionism. That there was an expansionist policy at the end of the 19th century is not debatable. After the Civil War the US became a world power.
In moving into the balance of power considerations, a number of decisive movements were made: the Dominican Republic was annexed in 1870, acquisitions in Samoa in 1878; helping Europeans control Morocco in 1880; the opening of Korea single handily in 1882; the manoeuvring for open markets in Congo in 1883-4; claiming rights to Pearl Harbour in 1887 and finishing the job in 1893; with arbitration being sought with the British over Nicaragua and Venezuela. By 1895 the attention of the Cubas battle for independence lead to the war with Spain over Cuba, and netted the United States the Philippines, Porto Rico and Guam in 1899.
By this stage the Asian market place was seen as the way out of the depression 1897 and lead to the dispatch of 5000 troops to China in 1900. [1] In questioning the reasons for the expansionist policy, those who have sought to impress the economic motives have been active. In 1900 F. H. Giddings in Democracy and Empire suggested that prior to 1898; the demands of the American businessman for new markets to alleviate the 1890s depression had influenced President McKinley to consider acquiring new territory in the Far East[2].
R. F. Pettigrew, a bitter opponent of the McKinley administration and former senator despised the depiction of the President being under the thumb of business. Williams, Kennedy, LaFeber, and Pletcher have more recently and more sophisticatedly, examined the deterministic nature of the coinciding rise in the acquisition of foreign territory and the increase in foreign trade. All studies though give reference at some point to the depression of the 1890s which was thought to have occurred due to over production.
However, Damiani, in Advocates of Empire argues that after examining documents after the signing of the armistice failed to uncover much evidence that suggests that McKinley was influenced into war by business. Nor, he argues, did the administration have a well defined plan for empire. He states that McKinley was not particularly enthusiastic about expansion and that the advocates of empire stumbled along the imperial path fitfully and uncertainly. ] All that this shows is that internationalism was not to occur faster than the US, or President McKinley, was ready for it. Congress had been a hotbed of interventionist acrimony since 1895. After the resumption of the insurrection in 1895, Cuban dissidents would seek US nationalism, and return to fight in Cuba demanding US support. US investments in Cuba totalled 50mn, which were primarily in sugar plantations, and were being destroyed by the Spanish[4]. These compromised US neutrality and brought forth Monroe Doctrine and manifest destiny rhetoric.
In 1896, Spain implemented a policy of Reconcentrado which was effectively the establishment of barbarous concentration camps and refused the US offers of support in crushing the revolution. On 19th April 1896 Secretary of State Olney unleashed the renowned 21 inch gun which stated that the US would support Spain in mediation attempts, in an attempt to appease the jingoes. Democratic President Cleveland agreed, refusing to enter the disagreement, but stated that it could not continue in the way that it had.
Otherwise a situation will be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations[5]. Jingoism within the congress called for the recognition of the Cuban insurgents, who would receive no support from the office of the President or Secretary of State. Basically the US could not assume that the European powers would remain aloof from a Spanish-American conflict. The elections of 1896 saw William McKinley campaign on the need to end the insurrection in Cuba as periphery issue.
Yet his drive to war was cautious, and although he expressed a deep and abiding interest in Cuba, there was considerable reluctance to go to war[6]. Some commentators, both at the time and subsequently, have referred to McKinley as a weak politician who was under the thumb of business, [7] yet there is significant evidence to assert that McKinley was a shrewd and careful political decision-maker[8]. In fact a study of the private correspondence before the war shows McKinley reluctant to engage Spain, due to a perception of a weak navy and home front attack.
The people with which McKinley surrounded himself reinforce this view, with Sec. State Sherman and Sec. of Navy Long, two whom regularly agreed with the President on foreign policy matters. In June 1897 Secretary of State, Sherman, protested to the Spaniards on the human rights abuses that was occurring under the reconentrado policy, and demanded that it cease. In August the Spanish tardily replied, claiming that the US were overreacting, but by October a change of personnel had seen the policy scaled back significantly.
In mid-December the New York Journal uncovered and published a letter from Enrique Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish Minister to the United States, to a Spanish official; which called McKinley weak and a bidder for the admiration of the crowd, besides being a would be politician who attempts to leave the door open behind himself while keeping on good terms with the Jingoes in his party. [9] The letter must have affected McKinley personally, encouraging him to step up the priority of resolving the issue. After the war, further reluctance to colonise the Philippines[10], which is only perused due to a perceived political necessity.
McKinley went to war for strong reasons, and in a strong position. He displayed a welcomed reluctance to go to war, but highlighted that he was not willing to back down from duty. The publicity that this received in the United States was enormous, and considerable empathy was evoked. In 1898 Senator Proctor, an influential voice within the Republican Party visited Cuba and declared to Congress that, it is not peace or war. It is desolation and distress, misery and starvation. [11] Expansionist ideas were not a new to American foreign policy makers in the late 19th Century.
In fact, during the Civil war of 1865, perspectives within Washington shifted south as the Monroe Doctrine was under threat; Mexico was being penetrated by European powers[12]. After the Civil War a bipartisan approach was taken to ensure that the United States upheld a sphere of influence to her south. This was a strategic imperative, and had been embodied in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. The reasons, for the expansionist policy, are multifarious, but centralised in an instilled self-righteousness of open doors and Republicanism.
The context, globally, was the age of empires, consumed with an unrestrained search for markets[13]. Domestically; the importance of these markets was reflected in the real industrial output of the US; justified using race, manifest destiny and the development of civilization. Expansionism in the late 19th century represents assertive, pragmatic and intentional attempts to ensure wide scale economic growth and the preservation of what had already become the American way of life. During the 1820s the Washington felt that it was adequately endowed to regionally assert itself.
The Monroe doctrine of 1823, proclaimed emphatically and paradoxically, that European nations should consider that any attempt, on their part, to extend their system to any part of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety[14]. Explicitly, the meaning is that the any encroachment on the continent will be considered a threat. However the doctrine was two fold, and argued that, as quid pro quo America would not intervene in the affairs of Europe. If America to assume that any extension of Europe on the American continent was dangerous, then the intent was ensure a sphere of influence; and primarily, the geography made it possible.
