NORAD has developed concepts to meet the security challenges of the 21st Century. Achieving these concepts will provide NORAD the capabilities required to protect our homelands against aerospace threats in 2010 and beyond.
PRECISION TRACKING is required to detect and track any air or space threat to North America from its origin — in space, in the air, from land or sea — because NORAD must know exactly where a threat is to precisely engage it.
PRECISION ENGAGEMENT provides NORAD the capability to precisely engage threats throughout the full range of our surveillance coverage to ensure off-shore threat engagement well before air and space weapons threaten Canadian or American citizens. This requires agile platforms with lethal munitions to enage targets more responsively and accurately from longer distances and precise, immediate operational assessments with the agility to re-engage if required. The system will include a flexible, near real-time targeting architecture, including space-based wide area surveillance, rapid identification, tracking, and near real-time sensor to shooter links.
INTEGRATED BATTLE MANAGEMENT A system of systems providing seamless battle management to fuse information from our NORAD regions and adjacent CINCs and Commanders. This allows NORAD to receive and give effective support to our forces during peacetime and wartime. Such interoperability will become more important as sea, land and air forces create a credible NORAD defensive shield over North America.
FOCUSED LOGISTICS is an agile and responsive logistics system in 2010 to support NORAD’s missions. This sytstem fuses information, logistics and transportation technologies to support rapid crisis response by tracking and shifting assets to deliver tailored logistics packages and sustainment when and where they are needed.
INFORMATION SUPERIORITY and technological innovation are critical to providing NORAD with precision tracking, precision engagement, focused logistics and integrated battle management capabilities. Information superiority is the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same, an ability that will revolutionize warfare. A system of systems linking networks of sensors, command and control, and shooters will allow NORAD to use “network centric warfare” to increase our joint/combined combat power. Timely, relevant information will provide highly accurate and near real-time shared battlespace awareness to create a seamless observe-orient-decide-act loop. Information superiority will substantially enhance NORAD’s ability to defend our homelands in a very uncertain future.
Space is key to NORAD providing a credible defensive shield over North America. Space-based assets have many advantages over conventional surveillance and communications systems, particularly in their continuous availability and global presence. Space systems will permit precision tracking of hostile air and space vehicles, cue conventional forces to precision engagements, facilitate focused logistics, and are crucial to information superiority. These capabilities, when combined, will provide for our long-term security in a dynamic and potentially dangerous world, deterring those who have something to lose, and countering those who don’t. In the future, this could include a limited defense against ballistic missiles and an effective cruise missile defense. Today, NORAD is on the right track to protect our homelands against air and space threats in 2010 and beyond.
2. The 1994 Defence White Paper reaffirms the primacy of Canada-US defence cooperation in the post-Cold War era and that Canada will continue to modify its defence relationship with the US, consistent with the priorities of the new era. Specifically, it states that:
a.Canada-US cooperation continues to serve our fundamental interests;
b.the Canadian Forces need to work closely with US Armed Forces and remain interoperable; and
c.if Canada were to reduce significantly the level of defence cooperation, it would be obliged to rely upon the US to assist in protecting its territory and approaches, with such assistance coming strictly on American terms.
3. Mechanisms for cooperation. There currently exist between Canada and the US:
a.80+ treaty-level defence agreements;
b.more than 250 memoranda of understanding between the two defence departments; and
c.approximately 145 bilateral fora in which defence matters are discussed.
4. There are approximately 600 Canadian Forces’ personnel currently serving in the US, mostly in NORAD-related assignments. As well, over 20,000 visits are conducted annually to the US by Canadian government and industry representatives related to defence activities.
10. Canada-United States Regional Planning Group (CUSRPG). The Canada-US Regional Planning Group was formed in 1949 to oversee one of the five area structures designated by NATO as commands. While detailed planning for the North American theatre takes place in the Military Cooperation Committee, the CUSRPG provides the interface to the NATO Headquarters structure. Most CUSRPG personnel serve concurrently on the MCC. The CUSRPG’s level of activity has increased significantly within the context of NATO expansion and more specifically, the commencement of Partnership for Peace training in North America. In addition, efforts are currently underway to make CUSRPG more effective in representing the North American theatre within NATO; namely, through expanded joint representation internally and greater interaction with the International Military Staff.
11. North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). Formed in 1958, NORAD has undergone several changes in response to the changing threat to North America. The 8th NORAD Agreement renewal of March 1996 redefined the mission in terms of Aerospace Warning and Control. Additionally, provisions were incorporated into the Agreement permitting expansion of roles and missions should both nations agree. Having recently celebrated its 40th anniversary, NORAD provides Canada with its principal defence capabilities in the aerospace medium and represents a pillar of our defence relationship. The command continues to plan for future changes in defending the North American continent.
12. Other mechanisms for cooperation. Defence Development and Defence Production Sharing Arrangements manage defence industrial, trade and R & D aspects of Canada-US defence cooperation (trade flow approximately $2 billion annually). Reduced defence requirements have placed pressure on Canadian and US defence industries to seek alternative ways through which to sustain viability. This pressure has prompted US initiatives to renegotiate some of these production-sharing arrangements which could impact adversely upon benefits currently derived in Canada from these arrangements.
13. Mutual Support and Integrated Lines of Communication (ILOC) Memoranda of Understanding are designed to facilitate cooperation in training and operations. Mutual Support Memoranda provide reciprocal logistical support, supplies and/or services in non-routine situations. ILOC provides similar support (for example, US resources were used to repatriate CF troops from Somalia).
14. US-Canada information and intelligence exchanges provide mutually beneficial collection and analysis with an overall value to Canada exceeding $2 billion annually.
15. The Canada-US Testing and Evaluation Program (CANUSTEP) was established in 1983 as an umbrella agreement, allowing the US Department of Defense access to Canadian military test and evaluation facilities. Renegotiated in 1993, the current ten-year agreement provided Canada access to otherwise unavailable facilities. Testing has included sonobuoys, anti-armour munitions, F/A-18 aircraft upgrades and unarmed cruise missiles. Because incremental costs are charged for specific tests only, this arrangement has significantly reduced both countries’ costs for tests, evaluations and certifications previously conducted under other arrangements.
16. Combined training is an important part of Canada-US defence cooperation, ensuring interoperability and operational effectiveness. Maritime Command conducts operational training exercises (MARCOTs) and participates routinely in United States Navy exercises. Land Force Command participates in small unit exchanges and military competitions. Air Command conducts “Maple Flag” and participates in several US Air Force “Flag” exercises and “William Tell” competitions. Moreover, without this agreement, Canada would be clearly incapable of conducting a wide range of tests currently conducted at US facilities.
NORAD’s surveillance and control responsibility for North American airspace is divided among three NORAD Regions — one in Canada, one in the continental United States and one in Alaska. Data from radars and sensors based in Canada are compiled and analyzed at an underground complex located at Canadian Forces Base North Bay, Ontario, then forwarded to Canadian NORAD Region Headquarters at CFB Winnipeg, and the NORAD command and control centre in Colorado, as necessary.
The North Warning System (NWS) provides surveillance of potential attack routes via Arctic airspace. The NWS consists of 15 long-range radars (11 in Canada, four in Alaska) and 39 short-range radars (36 in Canada, three in Alaska) along the northern edge of North America. The state-of-the-art radars form a 4,800-Km-long and 320 Km-wide “tripwire” stretching from Alaska to Newfoundland.
E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
Airborne radar coverage is provided by the E-3 AWACS aircraft when necessary. Canada contributes military personnel to AWACS operations. The United States Air Force AWACS provides a significant improvement over ground-based radar stations, and extends the perimeter radar system in times of increased alert. AWACS aircraft can detect targets from about 580 Kms, then guide Canadian or U.S. aircraft to visually identify unknown aircraft.
Two Canadian bases provide designated support to AWACS operations when required: CFB Cold Lake, Alberta, and CFB Bagotville, Quebec.
1 Canadian Air Division is the military organization responsible for providing combat-ready air forces to meet Canada’s commitments to the defence of North America and to maintain the sovereignty of Canadian airspace.
Canadian air defence forces assigned to NORAD include 441 and 416 Tactical Fighter Squadrons at CFB Cold Lake, Alberta, and 425 and 433 Tactical Fighter Squadrons at CFB Bagotville, Quebec. All four squadrons fly the CF-18 Hornet fighter aircraft.
Since 1991, NORAD has assisted in the detection and monitoring of aircraft suspected of illegal drug trafficking. In cooperation with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and U.S. drug law enforcement agencies, the Canadian NORAD Region monitors all air traffic approaching the coast of Canada. Any aircraft that has not filed a flight plan may be directed to land and be inspected by the RCMP and Customs Canada.
There are currently 283 Canadian personnel based at various locations in the U.S. However, the actual number of Canadians assigned to designated NORAD positions constantly changes to reflect the current needs of Canadian defence policies.
Canada’s Policy on Ballistic Missile Defence
The proliferation of short-, medium- and long-range ballistic missile technology to an increasing number of countries represents a potential security challenge. This technology can already threaten Canadians on some military and peace support operations in various regions of the world. In the longer term, ballistic missile technology is a potential risk to Canada itself. It is important, therefore, for Canada to understand this challenge and the proposed measures our Allies are considering to deal with this problem – including ballistic missile defence (BMD) against long-range missiles. The Government of Canada is closely following these developments but has made no decision with regard to Canadian participation in BMD.
United States Plans for a National Ballistic Missile Defence System
In February 1996, the U.S. formally adopted the “three plus three” approach to developing a National Missile Defense capability. The intent of this approach was to attain, within three years, the requisite technological capability to field such a system. Deployment of the system would then follow within three years, should the threat warrant. The U.S. will give equal consideration to the technical feasibility of the initiative and an on-going threat assessment before making the ultimate decision to deploy a National Missile Defense system.
Recently, the Pentagon projected a timeframe of 2005 for the earliest deployment of a National Missile Defense system.
The United States’ objective is to develop the capability to defend against a limited number of ballistic missiles aimed at its territory – that is to say, an accidental or unauthorized launch or, possibly, an attack from a rogue state.
Canada’s Involvement in Ballistic Missile Defence
To date, Canada has limited its activities concerning BMD to research and consultation with the United States and other like-minded nations. This reflects the 1994 Defence White Paper guidance, which specifies that such activity will be conducted in order to gain a better understanding of missile defence in conjunction with the evolution of North American and possible NATO-wide aerospace defence arrangements.
Any decision by the Government on Canada’s role in BMD would be determined only after a comprehensive review of possible implications. Moreover, as stated in the 1994 Defence White Paper, Canadian involvement would have to be cost-effective, make an unambiguous contribution to Canadian defence requirements and build upon missions already performed by the Canadian Forces, such as surveillance and communications. Also, Canadian involvement would be predicated on the proposed system being compliant with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, or an updated treaty negotiated with Russia, as well as other arms control and disarmament agreements, protocols and arrangements.
Canada will continue its efforts to develop a better understanding of the U.S. ballistic missile defence program. This involves ongoing consultations with the U.S. for the specific purpose of determining what a future BMD system might entail.