She then attempts to justify abortion through analogical r seasoning beginning with the thought experiment of the “sick violinist”. Of Lowing that, Thompson extends the conclusions derived from the analog y to address cases where the mothers life is threatened, where fertilization is accidental, and finally where the mother ends the pregnancy simply at her convenience. The “sick violinist” thought experiment is as follows: you are kidnapped against your will, and your bloodstream is connected to that of a famous violinist who desperately needs a spare set of kidneys.
You must remain connected for nine months or else the violinist shall die. Is it morally justified for you to unplug you Ursula from the violinist even though it results in his certain death? Thompson compares this scenario to that of an unwanted pregnancy, where the mother (you) are forcibly attached to the fetus (violinist)). (I, Thompson, C 2015 p. 0238) State 2 The analogy explicitly addresses cases where the mother is impregnated against her will, just as you are connected to the violinist against your will.
Thompson co encodes that the fetus as a person has a right to life, but she emphasizes that due to the noncom ensues nature of the connection, your right to bodily autonomy us persuades that of the fetus and therefore you are morally justified in unplugging yourself. A point of note is that the analogy relies on the assumption that the woman was raped. To counter this argument, Thompson presents the peoples analogy. She asks us to imagine that a woman installs fine mesh in her Window was to prevent people’s from entering and forming appellants.
I f a mesh screen were defective and a appellant sprouted, would it be wrong to remove the plant? 2, Thompson, C 2015 p. 0243) This is equivalent to asking if abortion is morally justified in cases of FAA led contraception. Thompson extends the sick violinist analogy by asserting the at in cases where the mother did not intend to conceive, the resulting fetus is again occupying the mothers body without consent. Consequently, the unwanted fetus’ right to life is trumped by the mother’s bodily freedom. Thompson accounts for the profile argument by imagining a scenario i n which she is deathly ill and only the touch iota man named Henry
Found can save her, hut he lives thousands of miles away, Even though h it is decent for Henry Found to travel to her and save her, he is not obligated to. However, if he were in the same room as her, it would not be morally justified for him to walk away. (3, Thompson, C 2015 p. 0241) In a sense, she is distinguishing between a Good Samaritan and a Minimal lye Decent Samaritan. She finally asserts that the fetus’ right to life should not force e the mother to be anything beyond a Minimally Decent Samaritan. State 3
Thompson concludes by emphasizing the fact that her solution inherently in evolves a gray line where we must decide whether the abortion of the fetus is j justified or Whether it would be negligent Of the mother to kill the child. (4, T homophones, C 2015, p. 0245) Her use of analogical reasoning helps her make the concepts of abortion more relatable, but sometimes the two scenarios she pr scents are not morally equivalent, undermining the validity of her conclusions. A major critic of Thompson sick violinist analogy is Noon, who argues that SSH
