The main argument concealed in this statement is that of utilitarianism demanding too much from us when considering topics such as murdering to lessen murder. It is paradoxical to disagree with something yet use that very objectionable act to minimise the number of the same objectionable act.
I will try and dismantle this tug-of-war—between what one ought or ought not to do—by reflecting on the doctrine of deontological constraints and conclude with an un-demanding finale of how one’s ethics (thereby my agreement with deontological constraints) do not provide basis for all ethics (and every person’s ethics), merely a motivation to thoroughly analyse thought-experiments which question our very morals. The paradox arises when we take into account an objectionable act, such as murder, in which we are committed into thinking that one is worse than none, and therefore it must follow that more murder is worse than one murder.
Furthermore, there is a pre disposed notion of a “better” state of affairs, such that one ought to do anything to reach that “better” state of affairs, if the consequence is that of maximisation of “good”: less murder in the long run. This type of reasoning is that of a consequentialist, the doctrine that one’s actions are founded in what outcome they bring about, and the point I will argue. Scheffler, although not a consequentialist, supported this notion in so far that he made notable secondary conflict, that of our inclination towards both deontological constraints and maximising reasoning.
We justify consequentialism because there is an instinctual ‘better’ state of affairs to be in, yet to reach that point we feel obligated to go against our morals. To open up this explanation, I must first introduce the appropriate terminology: deontology is that term coined by Bentham that indicates the utilitarian doctrine of the nature of duty and obligations. In other words, it is the moral theory that helps one assess our everyday choices and decisions— what we ought and ought not to do.
Therefore, when talking about deontological constraints, an absolutist limit is introduced such that if one ought not do X, then one ought not to do X, even if it prevents more acts of type X. Maximising reasoning, on the other hand, is a term used by Utilitarian’s to describe the fundament of rational thinking, that of desiring a certain goal, less murder, and therefore if it is undesirable for there to be more of it, then one should take the precautions necessary to make sure more murder doesn’t happen.
One of the most fundamental reasons I feel aversion towards consequentialism is due to Kant’s philosophy on never treating persons as a means but as an end. Developed by Nozick, what is meant by this is the idea of distinctiveness of persons, or that individuals are separate and have rights and lives that can’t be disregarded. He entirely opposes consequentialism on the basis that there is no general ‘good’ to please, only distinct individuals; there is no impartial consequence, only personal and impersonal sacrifice, which can never amount to an ‘ethical good’, unless the agent at hand is also affected (positively) by the consequence.
But there is no social entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good. There are only individual people, different individual people, with their own individual lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the others. Nothing more. What happens is that something is done to him for the sake of others. Talk of an overall social good covers this up. To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.
He does not get some overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and no one is entitled to force this upon him-least of all a state or government that claims his allegiance (as other individuals do not) and that therefore scrupulously must be neutral between its citizens. ” My second objection is that underlined by Filippa Foot, in which she emphasises the importance of states of affairs; the importance of circumstance, and the non-existence of an ethical mould for right and wrong doing.
For Foot (and for me), there are no better or worse states of affairs, only situations that have to be considered individually; there aren’t any content-neutral cases, only content-sensitive ones, and therefore any type of objective moral claim has to be systematically false. For example, I’ll bring up the infamous trolley problem thought experiment: a runaway train is headed towards a train track with five people unable to get out of the way.
By chance you find yourself near the switch that can alter the course of the train to a separate track which only has one person tied down, unable to get out of the way. The usual response is one of saving the five lives as it has the best possible outcome. Let’s change the circumstances, just a little, and now show that the only way to save the lives of the five tied down on the train track, is by pushing a very large man off of a foot bridge above the train track. His great bulk would stop the train, but would not survive the impact.
Although both cases illustrate the sacrifice of one life over that of five, what the trolley problem examines is whether moral problems should be simply about outcomes, or about the manner in which one achieves it. According to Foot, it is important to not only criticise this consequentialist theory, but to criticise the very concept of “good” states of affairs as it pre-imposes consequentialism to be true. Although not a deontologist herself, she does come in agreement with proposing constraints, in order to allow some sort of system human beings can abide by.
If a “good” state of affairs is intended as something everyone must agree with, then it necessarily must be agent-relative, since (for example) for the man getting pushed off of the bridge, it is not in his best interest to stop the runaway train: he may jump off the bridge himself, believing that the lives of those five are in his hands—and therefore he must take a course of action—but his state cannot be categorised by some other consequentialist standard of “Good”. Whether you pull the switch, or push the man, is important only to the extent of how one views themselves as a person, not how everyone should view the situation at hand.
My last objection towards that of consequentialism, before returning to the tug-of-war described by Scheffler, is that of Kamm’s victim-centred reasons for deontological constraints. What Kamm suggests is an outlook similar to that of Nozick’s, as it illustrates the forfeiture of moral status for the victim. In other words, it is not only the act of murdering some people to prevent further murders, but a consequentialist’s acceptance and allowance of someone’s death to be a “good” .
The mere instinct of accepting one’s death as a benevolence for another’s benefit is most alarming; the paradox isn’t anymore a ‘what we ought to do’, but a ‘what we’re allowing to happen’. “Being permissibly harmed is therefore worse than being impermissibly harmed. Essentially, if all killings are condemned from a moral perspective, then at least from the perspective of morality, we are all thoroughly accorded a certain status: We are beings whose rights may never be violated. If we are allowed to sacrifice one, then that one loses this status.
Kamm doesn’t answer the imposed statement “should we murder to minimise murder” with a yes or no answer, but rather, changes the focus onto a much deeper reflection on permissible harm; the reflection on doing versus allowing harm. As agents we make objective judgements about right and wrong, but as it has been proven with the trolley problem, this isn’t so simple; objectivity is allowed no greater realm of moral permission, essentially creating an agent-neutral good. Even if imposition of deontological constraints aren’t the answer, murdering to prevent murder is a double effect that cannot be formatted as “Good”.
For example, let me bring up a separate account of murder to minimise murder scenario: a murderer is caught and sentenced to capital death to prevent more murders done by him. Is this okay? Instinctively one may say yes, and in the world we live in, acts of the same nature happen frequently. According to deontological constraints though, this man shouldn’t be given the death penalty, as it punishes the crime-doing with the crime itself; what sort of a world should one want to live in: one that abides by one’s personal moral judgements, or one that imposes objective and restrictive clauses?
Perhaps moral claims such as “murder is bad,” rather than being ‘objects’ in the real world, are simply secondary qualities, susceptible to human sentiment. Although I thoroughly believe in the humaneness of deontological constraints, I’m easily susceptible to circumstantiality, for instance if I needed to defend myself (otherwise I’d die), or if in the situation that I must prioritize the life of my sister over that of a stranger. Although hypothetical scenarios, there is a guilt in admitting this—thereby exposing inconsistency in moral judgements.
I watched a series of documentaries by the BBC on the topic of the death penalty and one specific account caught my eye: that of forgiveness between the killer and the victim’s loved ones. It wasn’t important anymore whether the bad man deserved punishment, but how the victim’s friends and relatives dealt with the situation at hand. Of course some wished his death, but the mother’s dose of human kindness surprised me and is what compels me to argue deontological constraints.
I believe it to be something quite cruel in human nature to turn the punishment of death into a justice, and therefore the question isn’t any more on the act of murder, but situation based morality. Another point I’d like to add is that of the Murder Act (UK’s abolition of the death penalty act) in 1965; under the convention of Human Rights, Nozick’s idea of distinctiveness of persons is re-applied, proving that humanity must have internalised the concept that murder does not minimise murder.
Overall, “the rarest of all human qualities is consistency. ” We strive for deontological constraints, yet instinctively want to support a utilitarian standpoint of ‘doing X for the greater good. ’ Yet, when our morals abide to instinct, it stops considering ethics, only in the sense that we act or react to an empathetic and internalized notion of right and wrong—that can’t be in concrete terms.
Therefore, if someone wishes to possess a defined account of morality, deontological constraints should be the answer—X (murder) is wrong and therefore contradictory with utilitarian statements of permitting acts X (murder) to decrease acts X—because through Nozick, Foot, and Kamm we are able to value individual’s rights and context; proving the bitter-sweet theory that more murder cannot defend the act of minimisation of murder, but at the same time, not justifiably satisfying, without harming or conflicting with some ethical standpoint.
